If Wigan manager Roberto Martinez looked different to you as you watched his club’s opening day destruction at the hands of newboys and universal 20th place pick Blackpool, it wasn’t because his arms weren’t folded. Bobby stood, often quite still, in the technical area probably wondering (like me, a Wigan supporter in the interest of disclosure) how it all went so wrong. Does Martinez have a poor understanding of tactics? Absolutely not, as our US readers can attest from his studio work for ESPN during the World Cup. Does Wigan have garbage players? Another no, as they were good enough to beat champions Chelsea 3-1, Liverpool 1-0 (admittedly not as good a win as in a normal year), Villa 2-0 on opening day, and overturn a 0-2 deficit to Arsenal in 10 minutes to win last season. What Roberto Martinez does need to understand at the club, however, is how to play his beloved 4-2-3-1 smartly with the personnel on hand, something that was exposed as a flaw during the 0-4 defeat to the Seasiders.
Before we explain the flaws of Wigan and I continually grumble about having gotten up at 10 AM during the summer to see such a stinker of a result, let’s take a look at a couple of other highly successful teams utilizing the current en vogue formation, the 4-2-3-1. You’ll recognize them immediately as the World Champions and the runners up: Spain and the Netherlands. Presented below as exhibit A is are the starting rosters from the World Cup final match, with better graphic from Wikipedia linked below.
Anyone who watched any Premier League or La Liga football will recognize immediately that both sides have a very clear and defined defensive midfield role. For the champion Spanish, it is played by Sergio Busquets, and for the Dutch Nigel De Jong. What you’ll also immediately notice is that they are paired with a couple stellar footballers: Xabi Alonso and Mark van Bommel, respectively. Perhaps neither of these players can be considered true, out and out, holding/defensive midfielders (van Bommel is arguable), but what is undeniable is the quality of these players and their ability to be solid in playing two-way football. Strong DMs are pivotal to success, especially in the 4-2-3-1. They patrol the area defensively that would be otherwise ripe for a counter-attacking team with a highly creative AMC/center mid to exploit and through which to distribute the ball. But they also provide that extra outlet for retaining ball possession that isn’t quite as negative as feeding it back to a DC or keeper, but isn’t positive enough as to be a low percentage pass in a jam situation. This is how Spain keeps so much possession (and why they are also a largely ineffective unit attacking, but that’s a story for another day).
So back to Wigan Athletic vs Blackpool. Roberto Martinez uses the preferred 4-2-3-1. Wigan get blasted by 4 at home against everyone’s favorite 20th place pick. Why, you ask? Certainly effort levels being low and the unsettling of squad by wantaway scum midfielder Charles N’Zogbia didn’t help any matters. But most importantly was the glaring weakness of defensive ability under the 4-2-3-1. We saw plenty of this last season as Latics conceded 79, including 9, 8 and two 5ers to United. Universally the defense is blasted. However, it’s hard to be in position correctly when you’re constantly needing to fill the shoes of your holding midfielders. Mohammed Diame played well enough, and he is the squad’s true DM. But this time, there was no van Bommel to the de Jong. No Xabi Alonso to Busquets. What happened? Tactical breakdown.
Consider an out of position 2nd holding midfielder in a 4-2-3-1 against Blackpool’s chosen 4-3-3 and consider that 2 of 3 midfielders have joined the rush:
–DR—(S)–DC—(S)—DC—-(S)—DL–
–(ML)—-DM–(MC)—-GAPING HOLE—
Unfortunately for Latics, the natural progression here is that a defender closes the glaring hole in the formation due to the absence or poor positioning of the 2nd holding midfielder. We’ll say for example that Maynor Figueroa the left back is coming in to close down (understanding that in reality Figueroa was caught out of position on the day as much as the 2nd DM, ruining the scheme even further) and it might look like the situation is under control. But watch the chaos that ensues if the MC beats Diame on the ball, or outpaces him, or any number of things happen:
—– (ML)DR – (S)DC — DC(S) — (S) —–
———-(MC) ———- Figueroa/DL—
———Diame —————————-
Now Figueroa is out of position and can’t recover on a pass or cross to the open striker AND doesn’t have time to close down the MC (or ML if they overlapped prior) on the ball. A DC could push up, but that just leaves another striker open. You can see the landslide of issues created from this one seemingly simple error. Also note the significant narrowing of the attack side of this formation, giving the MC on the ball a number of short pass or 1-2 opportunities from which to choose in beginning to final third/chance development sequence.
There, my friends in strong tactics, is where the flaw in the 4-2-3-1 lies (and interestingly enough, the same reason the 4-4-2 struggles so mightily against the 4-2-3-1 via such out-maneuverability). It must either be played with 2 defense first midfielders, or in the Spanish/Martinez style desire for more attractive football it must be played with arguably your toughest mental and most solid 2-way player on the park playing in the second holding role and able to support the true defensive mid at a moment’s notice. Shockingly, even with N’Zogbia’s imminent departure, this may be the fatal flaw to Wigan Athletic’s aims of reaching a 7th successive Premier League season for 2011-2012. Perhaps Roberto Martinez knows a good defense/positioning coach who also keeps his arms folded.
Written By Michael
DiAmore
(23 Posts) |
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